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Introduction
When the common agricultural policy (CAP) was con-
structed in the 1960s and 70s one distinctive feature, much 
remarked upon by outside observers, was its high levels of 
protection against third country imports. For many products 
a variable import levy bridged the gap between a fluctuating 
world market price and the EEC’s minimum import price.2 
In the Uruguay Round, tariffication put a stop to this prac-
tice, and modest reductions to the EU’s tariff bindings were 
negotiated. 
Tariffication, however, resulted in a compartmentalization 
of CAP decision-making. No longer were the Directorate-
General for Agriculture and the Council of Agriculture Min-
isters responsible, in the main, for determining border protec-
tion as part of the CAP. Instead this role had been ceded to the 
Directorate-General for External Relations (subsequently DG 
Trade) and the foreign affairs ministers. Moreover, whilst tar-
iffication meant that subsequent increases in the CAP’s levels 
of domestic market price support would no longer be reflected 
in increased border protection, equally reductions would no 
longer automatically trigger lower tariffs. 
Successive reforms of the CAP have resulted in further 
cuts in domestic support, but there have been no offsetting 
reductions in the EU’s farm tariffs, despite concerted efforts 
in the Doha Round to secure multilateral agreement on tariff 
cuts. One of the aims of the Doha Round, launched in 2001, 
in the negotiations on agriculture was to secure: ‘substantial 
improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view 
to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substan-
tial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support’ (WTO, 
2001: 3). Initial plans to complete the Round in 2003 were 
frustrated, but in 2008 an agreement did seem to be within 
reach that would have involved developed-economy mem-
bers of the WTO (such as the EU) reducing their highest tar-
iffs on agricultural goods by up to 70% (WTO, 2008). 
This paper discusses both the continuing failure of the 
Doha Round to deliver on those promised tariff reductions, 
through to, and including the 11th Ministerial Conference in 
Buenos Aires in December 2017 (MC11); and also the EU’s 
reluctance to do so unilaterally. The consequences of this 
failure to reduce the EU’s tariffs on these highly protected 
CAP products are profound, as: i) only preferential supplies 
satisfying specific criteria (e.g. rules of origin) can penetrate 
the EU’s protected market, thus reducing the potential gains 
from trade; ii) negotiation of Free Trade Area (FTA) agree-
ments is made more complicated than might otherwise be the 
case; and iii) extricating the United Kingdom from the EU 
(“Brexit”) is more problematic.
To explore these issues the article proceeds as follows. 
First it explains how the EU’s old variable import levy 
mechanism worked, and how tariffication put an end to this 
practice. Second it argues that tariffication resulted in a com-
partmentalization of EU decision-making, and shows how 
subsequent CAP reforms have resulted in significant reduc-
tions in domestic support, with no offsetting reductions in 
border protection, despite the aspirations expressed at the 
launch of the Doha Round in 2001. The third substantive 
section explores the political economy constraints that limit 
the actions of the EU’s trade negotiators and (seemingly) 
preclude unilateral tariff reductions. Finally the text explores 
the political economy consequences of the EU retaining 
these excessively high tariffs, before concluding.
Variable import levies, and then 
tariffication
The ‘old’ CAP of the 1960s and 1970s, certainly as epito-
mised by the support arrangements for cereals, was depend-
ent upon three key policy measures: high levels of border 
protection to stop cheap imports accessing the EU and 
undercutting EU market prices; sale of products into inter-
vention at guaranteed prices should domestic prices weaken; 
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and payment of export subsidies (called export refunds by 
the EU) to encourage traders to sell surplus products to third 
country markets. As a result EU market prices were often 
well in excess of world market prices (for examples see Rit-
son, 1997: 3). The basic, if flawed, rationale for this policy 
was that, by raising farm-gate prices, and hence farm rev-
enues, farm incomes would be boosted too. But small farm-
ers, with little to sell, would not have much gain, whereas 
larger farmers with more sales would do disproportionately 
well; farm costs would tend to rise and absorb much of the 
increase in farm revenues, in particular the resultant increase 
in land prices would benefit landowners rather than tenant 
farmers; and a larger population would be retained on the 
farm, thus depressing ‘the individual earnings of persons 
engaged in agriculture’.
The international community’s ire frequently focussed 
on the disruptive impact of the EU’s export subsidies: indeed 
by the mid-1980s the USA and the EU were engaged in an 
export subsidy war in which each used taxpayers’ money 
to try to expand their export markets. As a USDA report 
acknowledged, the purpose of the Export Enhancement Pro-
gram of 1985 was ‘to aggressively recapture lost markets’ 
(Porter & Bowers, 1989: 19). However, the system of mar-
ket price support would have been impossible to maintain 
had border protection not kept cheap imports out of the EU’s 
protected market. Moreover, the insulating effect of the EU’s 
variable import levy was insidious, not only blocking access 
to its protected market from more competitive overseas sup-
pliers, but also tending to create price instability on world 
markets (see Johnson (1975) for a discussion of the likely 
impact of national price stabilisation schemes).
Dam’s extensive review of the EEC’s emerging support 
arrangements for cereals clearly identified how the variable 
import levy would work: 
‘The essential idea is to set in advance the desired inter-
nal price ... . The import levy is then varied as often and as 
much as necessary to make up the difference between the 
lowest price on the world market and the target price. … The 
variable levy has some dramatic economic effects for a defi-
cit area. It places the entire burden of adjustment to varia-
tions in local supply and demand on third-country suppliers. 
No matter what quantity is produced (short of a surplus) or 
demanded locally, domestic suppliers receive the promised 
prices.’ (Dam, 1967: 217-8).
In the annual farm price review under the ‘old’ CAP the 
Council of Ministers set support prices for the following 
year (Harris & Swinbank, 1978). By way of example, the 
evolution of support prices for sugar for the period 1972/3-
1976/7 is shown in Table 1. Annually, on a proposal from the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers fixed both a common 
intervention, and a threshold (i.e. minimum import), price for 
white sugar, as reported in the Table, although with boom-
ing world commodity prices in 1974 a second round of price 
fixing took place. Over this period the threshold price for 
sugar was being set some 16/17 per cent above the common 
intervention price.
Tariffication, a central plank of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2009: 
55-6), changed all that. The old systems of border protection 
– not only the EU’s variable import levy, but other coun-
tries’ protective mechanisms as well – created uncertainty 
for traders, and they could not readily be subjected to bilat-
eral concessions on tariff reductions in trade negotiations. 
Consequently the Uruguay Round negotiators decided that 
all existing systems of border protection would be con-
verted into conventional tariffs (fixed in either specific or 
ad valorem terms) by computing the difference between a 
representative internal price with an appropriate external 
price over the ‘base period’ 1986–8. These tariffs would 
be bound: that is they became part of the country’s WTO 
Schedule of Commitments and could not be increased with-
out the consent of other WTO Members in accordance with 
GATT Article XXVIII procedures. Moreover, as part of the 
Uruguay Round agreements, developed countries agreed to 
reduce these bound tariffs by 36% on average, over a six-
year implementation period, and by no less than 15% for 
any particular tariff line. The EU also agreed additional 
constraints on the tariffs it would charge on cereals (and, at 
the time, husked rice) to ensure that the duty-paid import 
price for cereals would not exceed 155% of the effective 
domestic support price (Swinbank, 2017: 4). WTO Members 
can charge lower tariffs than these bound rates (i.e. applied 
tariffs), but whatever tariff is charged has to be applied on a 
most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis.3 
Countries undertook their own calculations, which were 
barely scrutinised by other WTO negotiators in the run-up 
to the meeting in Marrakesh in April 1994 that finalised the 
round. Thus, for white (refined) sugar, the EU declared a tar-
iff equivalent of 524 ecu per tonne, and committed to reduce 
this by 20 per cent to reach a new bound rate of 419 ecu 
per tonne in 2000 (Swinbank, 2004).4 The maths that under-
pinned this determination is interesting: the internal support 
price for white sugar over the base period (1986-8) was said 
to be 719 ecu per tonne, from which was subtracted an exter-
nal price of 195 ecu per tonne.
In closing this section it is important to make two points. 
First, that tariffication, and the limited tariff reductions 
agreed in the Uruguay Round, resulted in very high tariffs 
3 GATT Article I provides for most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment in that no 
WTO Member is to receive treatment less advantageous than that offered to the most 
favoured nation, except in three circumstances: i) in a Free Trade Area (FTA) or Cus-
toms Union sanctioned by GATT Article XXIV; ii) when preferential access is offered 
to developing countries, as in a General System of Preferences (GSP); or iii) when 
country-specific tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were grandfathered into Members’ Sched-
ules of Commitments at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
4 This ecu (European Currency Unit) translates directly into today’s euro (€).
Table 1: Intervention and Threshold Prices for Sugar, 1972/3 to 
1976/7 (Units of account per tonne*)
1973/4 1974/5 1974/5** 1975/6
Common 
Intervention 
Price
235.7 252.2 264.8 304.5
Threshold 
Price 276.0 294.7 308.0 355.2
Council 
Regulation 
No.:
1637/73 1600/74
2496/74 & 
2518/74***
660/74
* This unit of account is not directly comparable with later units. See Ritson & 
Swinbank (1997) 
** A second increase within the year, from 7 October 1974 
*** A Commission, rather than Council, Regulation 
Source: Regulations published in the Official Journal of the European Communities
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on a number of CAP products: €419 per tonne in the case 
of white sugar cited above. Second, the EU’s border protec-
tion on agricultural products was now fixed. The displaced 
variable import levy had automatically increased as support 
prices went up, and similarly might be expected to have 
decreased had support prices been cut. But that link was now 
broken. Indeed, as outlined below, despite significant reduc-
tions in the EU’s support price for white sugar, the MFN 
tariff remains at a prohibitively high €419 per tonne, rather 
like the stranded carcass of a beached whale.
In 2014 about 70% by value of the EU’s agri-food 
imports were traded under the WTO’s MFN regime, with the 
remainder under concessional schemes for developing coun-
tries and FTA agreements. Of that 70%, some 43 percentage 
points came in over a zero MFN tariff (European Commis-
sion, 2015). This is not particularly surprising: it included 
tropical beverages (such as tea, coffee and cocoa), soybeans, 
and some cereals subject to a tariff suspension. The ten-
sions discussed in this article focus on the 20% of agri-food 
imports in 2014 that paid the full MFN tariff, and those that 
failed to penetrate the EU’s market because MFN tariffs for 
beef, dairy products, sugar, etc., were prohibitively high.
CAP reform and the failure of Doha
The 1992 MacSharry Reform was in part prompted by 
impasse in the Uruguay Round, but it then gave the EU 
enough policy leeway to accept the constraints of the Agree-
ment on Agriculture in 1994: a document that had been 
crafted with the EU’s “reformed” CAP in mind (Daugbjerg 
& Swinbank, 2009). The 1992 deal reduced support prices 
for cereals and beef, and introduced partially decoupled 
– taxpayer-funded – payments to compensate farmers for 
their implied revenue loss, but it did not alter the basic mar-
ket-price support arrangements, and the variable import levy 
mechanism. Thus Regulation 1762/92, setting out the new 
support arrangements for cereals, progressively lowered the 
threshold price. In the currency unit of the time, it was set 
45 ecu per tonne higher than the target price for each of the 
1993/94, 1994/95, 1995/96, and subsequent marketing years 
(Council of the European Communities, 1992: Article 3).
Tariffication was implemented later, after the Marrakech 
Agreement was signed in April 1994. As the European Com-
mission explained in proposing the changes: 
‘The fundamental change introduced by the new import 
arrangements is the replacement of variable charges (levies, 
compensatory amounts, etc.) and other types of non-tariff 
import restrictions … by stable, degressive tariffs. The intro-
duction of such tariffs will be effected, in legal terms, by 
means of a suitable amendment to the Common Customs 
Tariff … . The replacement of variable charges by the CCT 
duties implies the repeal of all the rules which refer to their 
calculation, i.e. in particular all provisions on the fixing of 
threshold prices, reference prices, etc. and the rules laid 
down for the calculation of variable charges applying to 
derived products’ (Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 1994: 35). 
Accordingly, in December 1994, agriculture ministers 
repealed the core CAP provisions fixing threshold prices and 
determining variable import levies (Council of the European 
Union, 1994).5 Tariffication was adopted with far less media 
publicity, and farm lobby opposition, than had been evident in 
the long debate over the MacSharry package. 
Tariffication severed the formal link that had previously 
existed between the import tax charged and levels of domestic 
market price support. This became evident in the Agenda 2000 
CAP reform, when some domestic support prices were reduced, 
but without any offsetting reductions in tariffs. As Swinbank 
(1999: 398) observed: ‘It is conceivable that in the years to 
come, CAP reform will entirely remove domestic support and 
export subsidies, and yet high import tariffs could be retained.’ 
Indeed, successive “reforms” of the CAP have further reduced 
domestic support, but there has never been a compensating 
reduction in tariffs (or even a proposal to reduce MFN tariffs). 
The cumulative impact this has had can readily be illustrated for 
butter and sugar, as presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Butter and White Sugar: €/tonne
Intervention 
Price for 
1992/3*
Support 
Price in 
2017
MFN Tariff 
from 2000
Within-
quota TRQ 
Tariff**
Butter 3,535.3 2,463.9 1,896 700
White Sugar 640.1 404.4 419.0 98.0
* As reported in (European Commission, 1994: T61 & T67), and then converted by the 
author into today’s euro (€) by applying the coefficient 1.207509 to the support prices 
reported at the time 
** For butter, the TRQ extended to New Zealand; for sugar, the so-called CXL TRQ
Source: Ritson & Swinbank, 1997; WTO (2016), Certification of Modifications and 
Rectifications to Schedule CLXXIII – European Union, WT/Let/1220 (Geneva: WTO); 
Regulation 1308/2013.
Thus after the farm price review determining support prices 
for the 1992/3 marketing year, intervention prices for these 
products were €3,535.3 per tonne for butter and €640.1 for 
sugar, as reported in Table 2. Tariffication, and the limited tariff 
reductions agreed in the Uruguay Round, resulted in the bound 
tariffs of €1,896 and €419 per tonne (for butter and white sugar 
respectively) that have applied from 2000 until the present. 
These were formidably – indeed prohibitively – high tariffs for 
MFN suppliers to pay. In the case of sugar, some developing 
countries had (and still have) access to the EU market with a 
zero duty, and other suppliers have since secured limited Tariff 
Rate Quota (TRQ) access paying a within-quota tariff of €98 
per tonne (so-called CXL sugar). New Zealand has access to 
a country-specific TRQ to access the EU’s butter market, at a 
within-quota tariff of €700 per tonne, but no longer fully avails 
itself of this opportunity.
The sugar regime was excluded from Ray MacSharry’s 
CAP reform, and only modest reductions in support prices for 
dairy products were achieved. A reform of the dairy regime was 
agreed in principle in 1999 (as part of Agenda 2000), but not 
implemented until the Fischler Reform of 2003. This reduced 
the 2003 support price of €3,282.0 per tonne by 25 per cent 
to €2,463.9 in 2007, where it has remained ever since. As 
there was no corresponding reduction in either the MFN tar-
iff, or New Zealand’s preferential rate, the net effect was to 
increase by €818 the element of redundant “protection” in 
the tariff, and eliminate New Zealand’s tariff advantage. As 
5 Some border measures do, however, remain part of the CAP. This Regulation also dealt 
with the need to constrain the deployment of export refunds to comply with WTO limits.
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the tide retreated the stranded whale carcass was left far from 
the sea!
For sugar, the reforms did not kick in until 2005/6, fol-
lowing a WTO Dispute Settlement case in which the EU 
had been found to be exceeding WTO limits on its exports 
of subsidised sugar (Ackrill & Kay, 2011). This “reform” 
brought the EU’s support price for white sugar down by 36 
per cent, from €631.9 to €404.4 per tonne. Consequently the 
MFN tariff on sugar is now greater than the official support 
price.
The EU has from time to time suspended its import 
duties on farm products: for example for cereals in 2007 as 
a ‘reaction to the exceptionally tight situation on the cereals 
markets and the record price levels’ (European Commission, 
2007), or the supply difficulties faced for industrial (non-
food) uses of sugar (Noble, 2012: 21). The EU’s Everything 
but Arms initiative, and a number of FTAs, have opened-
up the EU’s market to selected suppliers; and some limited 
adjustments have been made to tariffs and Tariff Rate Quo-
tas in its Schedule of Commitments lodged with the WTO 
as a result of EU enlargement and other renegotiations of 
particular tariff lines. But, in the main, its bound tariffs are 
unchanged from those determined in the Uruguay Round, 
and the applied tariffs it charges on a MFN basis remain 
aligned with its bound rates.
… and the failure of Doha
Meanwhile the Doha Round had trundled on. The first 
skirmishes had occurred as WTO Members prepared for 
their 3rd Ministerial meeting in Seattle in late 1999. That 
September the EU’s Council of farm ministers had discussed 
the forthcoming negotiations. Whilst affirming their commit-
ment to the European Model of Agriculture, they conceded 
that: ‘The European Union … is prepared to negotiate for 
lowering trade barriers in agriculture … . However, it must 
also obtain, as a counterpart, improvements in market oppor-
tunities for its exporters’ (Council of the European Union, 
1999).
The Seattle Ministerial, however, did not result in the 
expected launch of a Millennium Round; and it was not 
until 2001 that the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
– the Doha Round – got underway (WTO, 2001). The EU’s 
basic approach was still defensive. In January 2003 the EU 
rejected the more ambitious proposals for tariff reductions 
advocated by the USA and the Cairns Group,6 and proposed 
instead a repeat of the Uruguay Round formula: ‘an overall 
average tariff reduction of 36% and a minimum reduction 
per tariff line of 15%’ (European Commission, 2003). This 
was rather less generous than that negotiated in the previous 
round however, for a 36 per cent reduction of a lower base 
would have produced a smaller reduction in absolute terms.
In fairness to the EU it should be noted that the timing 
was not propitious. The Doha timetable had envisaged that 
the “modalities” for agriculture (i.e. a fairly detailed blue-
print for the final agreement) should be established by 31 
March 2003 (WTO, 2001: 3), and the chair of the agricultural 
negotiating committee was eager to receive input from WTO 
6 A group of like-minded states led by Australia that took its name from the coastal 
resort in Queensland, Australia (Kenyon & Lee, 2006).
Members so that the first draft modalities document could 
be written. Although the EU’s Commissioner for Agriculture 
and Rural Affairs, Franz Fischler, had launched an ambi-
tious Mid-term Review of the Agenda 2000 reform package 
– which in the summer of 2003 would be enacted as the first 
phase of the Fischler Reforms (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011) – 
this was not yet the EU’s confirmed, let alone official, policy. 
Consequently the EU was not yet in a position to make a 
more ambitious offer to its WTO partners.
The Fischler Reform, further decoupling support for 
key arable and livestock products, and the extension of 
this decoupling principle to most other products in 2004/5, 
including the sugar reform overseen by Marian Fischer-Boel, 
and her “Health Check” Reform concluded in November 
2008, fundamentally changed the EU’s circumstances and 
hence its freedom of manoeuvre in the Doha negotiations 
(Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2011). Brief mention should per-
haps be made of the most recent recalibration of the CAP, 
to configure the policy for the post-2013 period, but by then 
WTO pressures were no longer a force capable of driving 
CAP reform (Swinbank, 2015).7 
In none of these reforms had it ever been suggested that 
farm ministers should also enact reductions in border protec-
tion as part of the package. And that is true of the European 
Commission’s latest thoughts on a post-2020 CAP. In its 
discussion paper on The Future of Food and Farming the 
European Commission (2017: 25) makes only one (passing) 
reference to the WTO, followed by one mention of imports 
when commenting: ‘it cannot be ignored that specific agri-
cultural sectors cannot withstand full trade liberalisation 
and unfettered competition with imports. We therefore need 
to continue to duly recognise and reflect the sensitivity of 
the products in question in trade negotiations and explore 
ways how to address the geographical imbalances of advan-
tages and disadvantages that affect the farm sector within the 
Union as a result of EU trade agreements’ (emphasis in the 
original). 
By 2008, with soaring prices on world commodity mar-
kets (Piesse & Thirtle, 2009) the EU was able to complete its 
switch from a defensive to an offensive stance in the WTO. 
This new confidence could already be seen in 2003. Then 
the Council had declared: ‘This reform is … a message to 
our trading partners …. It signifies a major departure from 
trade-distorting agricultural support, a progressive further 
reduction of export subsidies, a reasonable balance between 
domestic production and preferential market access, and a 
new balance between internal production and market open-
ing.’ But it also stressed that the bargaining process was still 
in play: ‘the margin of manoeuvre provided by this reform in 
the DDA can only be used on condition of equivalent agri-
cultural concessions from our WTO partners. … Europe has 
done its part. It is now up to others to do theirs’ (Council of 
the European Union, 2003: 3-4).
Despite this optimism, and an ill-fated venture with 
the USA to influence the outcome of the negotiations, the 
Cancún Ministerial in September 2003 ended in failure; with 
the EU’s stance on agriculture probably a contributory factor 
7 Swinnen (2015: 4) writes: ‘The question with the 2013 CAP decisions is not so 
much whether they are radical reforms (the consensus on this is “no”), but whether 
they are captured appropriately by the term ‘reforms’ at all’.
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tinued disagreement over a Special Safeguard Mechanism 
(SSM) to benefit developing countries. Indeed, some months 
earlier the Special Agriculture Committee chair had reported 
‘that a substantial outcome on market access is not feasible 
for MC11’ (WTO, 2017a).
Institutional and political economy 
constraints
Two broad sets of questions emerge from the foregoing 
discussion. First if, as suggested above, WTO Members were 
close to an agreement on agriculture in 2008, why was it 
not possible to conclude the deal; and secondly why, with 
adherence to the Single Undertaking undermined by subse-
quent Ministerial decisions, is an agreement to reduce agri-
cultural tariffs still elusive? Had WTO Ministers agreed such 
a package, the EU – committed as it says it is to a rules-based 
system of international trade – would presumably have com-
plied.9
Second, if the Doha Round process has faltered, and the 
EU is in a position to unilaterally reduce its excessively high 
MFN tariffs on key CAP products (for example beef and 
sugar), why does it not do so? As discussed in the next sec-
tion, these high tariffs are now an impediment to the pursuit 
of its wider trade agenda, so why does the EU persist?
Quite why the Doha Round has (as yet) failed to deliver 
on its initial promise of major cuts in agricultural tariffs, 
and a significant tightening of the disciplines written into 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture apart from 
the 2015 decision to eliminate export subsidies, is a topic 
that will exercise scholars for years to come, and will not be 
discussed here. All that can be offered is two brief, tentative, 
observations. 
First that in an organisation (of 160+ members) built on 
consensus, whose modus operandi is based on a balanced 
exchange of “concessions” across a complex array of issues, 
agreement is intrinsically problematic, unless some outside 
pressure can force change. The USA and the EU, it might be 
argued, managed this in the Uruguay Round by terminating 
their membership of GATT 1947, together with all their obli-
gations to GATT’s other Contracting Parties. In its place they 
set up a new international trade agreement – the WTO – and 
invited the other members of the old GATT to join, provided 
they accepted the whole package of WTO agreements as a 
Single Undertaking, which they all did (Daugbjerg & Swin-
bank, 2009: 90-3; Steinberg, 2002). 
The USA and the EU no longer have hegemonic pow-
ers to coerce WTO members, and it is difficult to envisage 
a repeat of the American and European Uruguay Round 
ploy. The USA is still however a major force in the WTO, 
and as such does exercise veto powers. Thus a second fac-
tor explaining the current impasse is the stance of President 
Donald Trump’s administration. In a frank discussion at 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2017) in 
September 2017, prior to the WTO Ministerial, the United 
States Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer made clear 
9 The EU has for example implemented the decision to eliminate export subsidies 
(WTO, 2017b).
(see for example Bhagwati, 2004). In debriefing the Euro-
pean Parliament, the EU’s Trade Commissioner concluded 
that the Round was: ‘if not dead then certainly in intensive 
care’ (Lamy, 2003). Bhagwati (2004: 55), however, consid-
ered the outcome ‘more of a hiccup than a permanent end to 
the Doha process.’
The subsequent trajectory of the negotiations was dra-
matic and convoluted, but by June 2008 a fairly detailed 
Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture was on the table 
(see WTO, 2008, ‘Rev.4’, for the final December 2008 draft 
of this text). In conceding that the negotiators had failed to 
achieve the hoped-for breakthrough, Pascal Lamy (2008) 
– by now the WTO’s Director-General – did claim that ‘from 
a technical point of view, the issues are not intractable. In 
fact [he continued] from a purely technical perspective, you 
are not that far from an agreement on those issues. The bad 
news is that individual positions – and the position overall – 
have not changed significantly.’
Successive CAP reforms had meant – according to the 
EU – that most of its domestic support payments were no 
longer trade distorting, and accordingly it believed it would 
face no further constraints if the tighter limits on trade dis-
torting support envisaged in Rev.4 were implemented.8 
A series of reductions in intervention and other domestic 
market price support mechanisms, combined with the effects 
of inflation and the buoyant world market prices being expe-
rienced in 2008, meant the EU could now envisage a ban on 
the use of export subsidies: indeed it had committed to that 
outcome in Hong Kong in 2005. 
With EU farmers no longer reliant on market price sup-
port, and the EU able to countenance the demise of the export 
subsidy regime, the final element of CAP reform – removal 
of its excessively high border protection inherited from the 
‘old’ CAP of the 1980s – was surely feasible. Rev.4 had pro-
posed a ‘tiered formula’ for tariff reductions, with developed 
countries’ highest tariffs being reduced by up to 70 per cent 
over a five-year period (WTO, 2008: 14).
After 2008 WTO negotiators switched their emphasis 
from the Single Undertaking – the understanding that noth-
ing could be agreed until everything was agreed – which 
had successfully underpinned the Uruguay Round, to a 
more piecemeal approach. In Hong Kong in 2005 ministers 
had already agreed – in the context of the Single Under- 
taking – to the ‘elimination of all forms of export subsidies’ 
(WTO, 2005: 2); but then in Nairobi in 2015, no longer bound 
by the Single Undertaking, it was decided that ‘Developed 
Members’ would ‘immediately eliminate their remaining 
scheduled export subsidy entitlements’ (WTO, 2015: 2) – 
although, on closer reading, ‘immediate’ meant by 2020 for 
some products.
Although some WTO Members had hoped that some 
progress could be made on the agriculture dossier at their 
11th Ministerial Conference (MC11) in December 2017, 
including a tightening of disciplines on domestic support, 
this proved impossible (Bridges, 2017). There was certainly 
no movement on agricultural tariffs, in part because of con-
8  In WTO jargon, support that had previously been classified as Amber or Blue Box 
support had now been switched into the Green Box. See Daugbjerg & Swinbank (2009: 
59-62) for an explanation of Amber, Blue and Green Boxes. Whether the revised pay-
ment systems could legitimately be defended as Green Box support is a moot point.
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the USA’s lack of enthusiasm for multilateral, as opposed to 
bilateral, trade agreements, its distrust of the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement procedures, and predicted that ‘it’s unlikely that 
the ministerial in Buenos Aires is going to lead to negoti-
ated outcomes’. Without American backing the ministerial 
was unlikely to make substantive process. Indeed, ‘Ministers 
were unable to reach consensus on a ministerial declaration, 
despite multiple drafts being circulated … . Instead, minis-
terial conference chair Susana Malcorra issued a summary 
of the week’s discussions under her own responsibility’ 
(Bridges, 2017).
The second question posed above was why, if the EU is 
in a position to unilaterally reduce its excessively high MFN 
tariffs on many CAP products, it does not do so? There are 
probably several parts to the answer: the compartmentaliza-
tion of decision-making coupled with the mercantilist tradi-
tions of trade negotiators; political economy constraints with 
weak consumer voices no match for a well-resourced farm 
lobby (dispersed costs versus concentrated benefits); and the 
belief that preference erosion would weaken the existing ben-
efits enjoyed by the EU’s preferential suppliers and reduce the 
EU’s bargaining position in future FTA negotiations.
The compartmentalization of decision-making following 
tariffication, shifting the forum from agriculture to trade, has 
been outlined above. The Directorate-General for Agricul-
ture and Rural Development no longer has the responsibility, 
or authority, to fix (most) import taxes, as it did prior to 1995. 
The common commercial policy is one of the EU’s exclusive 
competences, vested in the European Commission, with DG 
Trade ‘the EU’s prime negotiator and guardian of an effec-
tively implemented EU trade policy’ (DG Trade, 2017). (The 
Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development also 
plays an active role in trade negotiations.) Trade negotia-
tors are loath to unilaterally allow increased market access 
to domestic markets if that improved access is unlikely to 
be reciprocated in some form – “concessions” in the trad-
ing partner’s tariff schedule, for example. Moreover, even 
if negotiators in the stalled Doha Round negotiations saw 
little scope for a mutual exchange of “concessions”, those 
tariff barriers could still be useful bargaining chips in future 
multilateral and bilateral trade talks.
Consequences: preferences, free 
trade areas, and Bexit 
Standard economic trade theory predicts that high tar-
iffs restricting access to the EU’s market will impose costs 
(higher prices, and a reduced range of available products) 
on European consumers and the wider economy. Access, in 
the main, will be limited to suppliers that have preferential 
agreements, be they generic schemes available to develop-
ing countries, FTAs, or country-specific TRQs grandfathered 
into the EU’s Schedule of Commitments in the Uruguay 
Round. Even if, by chance, preferential access has been 
granted to the world’s lowest cost suppliers (and often not!), 
the gains from trade will be abated by the additional customs 
procedures needed to check rules of origin, and TRQs may 
limit the volume supplied.
The EU’s protective tariffs on agricultural products are 
not fully reflected in EU market prices, particularly for those 
products for which the EU has emerged as a net-exporter, 
but some protective effect (which the farm lobby welcomes) 
remains. Third countries that have preferential access to 
these protected markets (for beef, sugar, etc.) are likely to 
bring diplomatic pressure to bear on the EU if they suspect 
that new trade initiatives will lead to preference erosion, 
whereas trade partners that do not have comparable access 
will seek to achieve the same through multilateral (i.e. Doha, 
or its successor) or bilateral (i.e. FTA) negotiations, or even 
by challenging the EU’s regime in Dispute Settlement pro-
ceedings. 
When the EU concludes FTAs, particularly with coun-
tries that have competitive farm sectors, agricultural com-
modities and food and drink products are often not fully 
liberalised. Instead, particular products might be written out 
of the agreement, or quantities limited by TRQs. Thus the 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) excludes trade in eggs and poultry products, and the 
duty free import of pork and beef into the EU is limited by 
TRQs.10 Access for beef is one of the major requests of Mer-
cosur, which is met by strong resistance by the EU’s beef 
producers (see for example White, 2018). Thus, as with mul-
tilateral negotiations, agricultural protectionism can block 
(or prolong) FTA negotiations.
One egregious example of the distortive effect of the 
CAP’s unreformed agricultural tariffs currently playing out 
relates to the United Kingdom’s attempts to leave the EU, 
and the issues this raises for trade across the Irish border 
(Swinbank, 2017 & 2018). In short, what the UK has been 
arguing for some time is that it is seeking to leave the EU’s 
customs union and single market (and the CAP), giving it 
the freedom to negotiate FTAs with other countries around 
the world, whilst maintaining an open – frictionless – border 
between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (which 
is part of the UK) and maintaining the integrity of the UK’s 
own internal market. How this particular conundrum will 
be solved is as yet unclear, but the challenge posed by the 
CAP’s high tariffs is a key concern with which policy makers 
must grapple.
Concluding comments
In 1992 the EU agreed a package of CAP reform that 
began a progressive dismantling and decoupling of farm sup-
port. In 1995, following a successful conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round of trade negotiations, agricultural tariffs were first 
bound, and then reduced. Those bound tariffs are the ones that 
are still applied on a MFN basis: since that initial bundle of 
tariff cuts there has been no systematic reduction in the EU’s 
agricultural tariffs despite a succession of CAP reforms. On 
some key products (beef, sugar, etc.) these MFN tariffs are 
prohibitively high, and exports to the EU are only commer-
cially feasible if preferential access arrangements are in place.
Past CAP reforms have been incomplete, and high tar-
iffs on selected products continue to protect some farming 
10 CETA explained: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-explained/ 
(last accessed 26 February 2018).
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activities distorting resource use in the agricultural sector. 
They impose costs on Europe’s consumers and frustrate 
potential overseas suppliers. Moreover, they complicate the 
EU’s wider trade diplomacy, including the ongoing Brexit 
negotiations. With the EU’s institutions deliberating on the 
form that the post-2020 CAP should take, perhaps now is the 
time to complete CAP reform.
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